







Canada’s current Consumer Price Index yields a biased and
unnecessarily imperfect measure of inflation. New measures 
of inflation and inflation expectations would provide 
more accurate, useful guides for the Bank of Canada’s 
inflation-targeting regime, post-2011.
NO. 287, APRIL 2009
MONETARY POLICYIn 2011, the inflation-targeting framework that guides Canadian monetary policy
will be 20 years old and will be due for renewal and possible revision. This
Commentary deals with the question of how to measure the price level underlying
the inflation rate that the Bank of Canada targets. It argues that monetary policy can
depend in important ways upon which price index is used in the inflation target and
also upon which indexes the Bank uses as sources of information. It reviews the
arguments for various choices of target price index and the lessons yielded by recent
research, both on price-level measurement per se and on optimal monetary policy. It
argues that Canada’s current CPI yields a biased and unnecessarily imperfect
measure of inflation, and looks at ways in which a more accurate and useful price
index could be created. It also assesses the usefulness of core inflation as a source 
of information for monetary policymakers. The Commentary concludes by
recommending that, in future, the Bank of Canada pursue targets for the behaviour
of a new, chained, superlative price index to be created by Statistics Canada. It also
recommends an extension of the range of inflation-indexed government bonds
available to the public, to improve the quality of market-generated information
about the likely future course of inflation. A survey of the inflation predictions of
private sector forecasters would complement this step, and so enhance the
measurement of the inflation expectations that play a key role in designing good
monetary policy.
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A
n inflation-targeting framework
has guided Canadian monetary
policy since 1991. In 2006, the
federal government and the Bank of
Canada renewed this framework until
2011, with a target range between 1 and
3 percent for the inflation rate and a
goal of keeping inflation near the 2
percent midpoint. 
At the same time, the Bank announced it was
researching whether the framework should be
revised in 2011, when it will be 20 years old. Since
we are now less than two years from that proposed
revision, it seems a propitious time to investigate all
aspects of Canadian monetary policy.
One possible decision for 2011 would be to
continue with the current framework. Another
would be to revise the inflation target – for example,
to use a range with a lower midpoint of, say, 1
percent. The Bank of Canada also is investigating a
third possibility: price-level targeting, sometimes
also called price-level-path targeting. Under this
regime for monetary policy, the Bank’s goal would
be to keep the price level near a predictable path –
perhaps involving growth at 2 percent per year. If
the price level rose faster than the path – that is, by
more than 2 percent – in one year, then the Bank
would try to ensure that it grew more slowly than
that in the following year so as to return to the
original, planned path. So bygones would not be
bygones under price-level-path targeting: a high
inflation rate in one year would be offset by a low
inflation rate thereafter. Inflation targeting, in
contrast, does not have this feature.
According to some economic analyses, price-level-
path targeting might simplify some decisions for
firms and households and lead to a more stable
economy overall, so it is the subject of careful
research, especially because the historical experience
with such schemes is rather limited.1 Whatever
regime for monetary policy the Bank of Canada and
the Government of Canada adopt, however, their
plan, or targeting framework, will become concrete
only with the choice of a price index with which to
measure the inflation rate or track the path. This
Commentary investigates that choice. 
I begin by looking at what happens now, both in
Canada and in several other countries. I then review
the arguments for various choices of price index,
and briefly discuss the treatment of the prices of
houses and other assets. I next discuss lessons from
economic research on optimal monetary policy and
the advantages and disadvantages of using core
inflation as an operational guide.
This review leads to two categories of
recommendations for the Bank of Canada, the
Department of Finance, Statistics Canada, and
economic forecasters. First, I outline several ways in
which the consumer price index (CPI) could be
improved and supplemented. My most radical
recommendation is that the Bank target the
inflation rate using a new, chained, superlative price
index, which I define below, rather than the
traditional CPI. Second, I describe the need for a
measure of forecasted, or expected, inflation as a
guide for monetary policy. 
I call these two types of missing information
“missing links,” because they would fit between the
instrument of monetary policy (the Bank’s target for
the overnight interest rate) and its ultimate goal of
delivering low and predictable inflation. Currently,
the CPI inflation rate is subject to systematic
measurement error that is quite large as a
proportion of the well-known 2 percent target. So
improving or replacing the CPI to reduce this error
would allow the Bank, and Bank-watchers, to track
its record better. 
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Forecasts or expectations of inflation are the
second missing link because monetary policy acts
on the inflation rate with a lag – sometimes
estimated to be about 18 months in Canada. As a
result of this lag, the Bank of Canada tries to adjust
the overnight interest rate to offset events that
would otherwise lead to a future inflation rate that
differs from the 2 percent midpoint of the target
range. The Bank can react to all sorts of
information and current events, but a natural focus
or operational guide is an index of expected
inflation that aggregates or weights all these
indicators automatically. 
Expected inflation has three very appealing
properties as a guide to policy. First, by definition,
it mechanically predicts subsequent inflation, which
is the target. We might each have our own forecast
or expectation of future inflation, but I refer here to
a consensus expectation calculated in a bond
market or by averaging professional forecasts, for
example. Such consensus measures have good
forecasting track records. 
Second, and more subtly, expected inflation
partly determines the inflation rate over the
medium term by influencing price-setting
decisions. This is an additional reason economists
and central bankers think measuring these
expectations is important. In fact, in June 2008,
several central banks, including the European
Central Bank, the US Federal Reserve, and the
Bank of England, took pains to communicate their
view that expected inflation matters more for the
evolution of the inflation rate than do changes in
relative prices such as those of corn or gasoline.
They emphasized this effect to counter suggestions
that spikes in commodity prices necessarily lead to
higher overall inflation. Overall, this influence of
expected inflation on actual inflation means that
monetary policy involves the management of
expectations. Indeed, some commentators
recommend that central banks explicitly target the
expected, future inflation rate. 
Third, expected inflation responds to changes in
the overnight interest rate. When expected inflation
is high (say, above 2 percent) and the overnight
interest rate rises, expected inflation then falls.
Using expected inflation as an operational guide
thus leads to stable inflation in the future.
All this implies that the Bank of Canada could
use an index of expected inflation as an operational
guide, and observers of monetary policy could also
use information on expected inflation to predict the
likely effects of monetary policy and to evaluate the
track record and stance of the central bank. In
Canada, however, we currently have no widely
accepted measure of expected inflation, so that is
the second missing link between the Bank’s
instrument and its ultimate target.
If we lack a good measure of expected inflation,
how can one be so sure that it predicts subsequent
inflation, affects current price-setting decisions, and
responds to policy changes? We know about these
properties from measurements of expected inflation
in other countries. For example, the well-developed
indexed debt market in the United Kingdom yields
market-based measures, while the Survey of
Professional Forecasters in the United States provides
a consensus survey measure. As I discuss below,
however, the Canadian market for indexed debt is
too narrow to generate reliable data and the use of
forecast surveys in Canada also is poorly developed.
Canadian macroeconometricians do observe
expected inflation indirectly in econometric
models. But both the practice and the assessment of
monetary policy could be improved with the
explicit measurement of inflation expectations.
What Happens Now
Before seeing how these links fit in, let us review
what happens currently. I noted above that the Bank
of Canada has a target range for the inflation rate of
1 to 3 percent, with a goal of keeping inflation near
the 2 percent midpoint. The inflation rate is
measured as the year-to-year growth rate in the CPI,
which is produced monthly. Other inflation-
targeting central banks do roughly the same thing –
indeed, both the Bank of England and Sweden’s
Riksbank have these same targets and bands. The
Reserve Bank of Australia has a target of 2 to 3
percent on average over the economic cycle; the
Banco Central do Brasil’s target for 2009 is 4.5
percent, with a range of 2.5 to 6.5 percent; the
Banco de México’s target is 3 percent; the Swiss
National Bank has a target of less than 2 percent,
C.D. Howe InstituteCommentary 287 | 3
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though it also monitors measurement bias in the rate
of inflation; and the Bank of Korea currently has a 3
percent target, with a range of 2.5 to 3.5 percent for
a three-year average of the inflation rate. As with all
inflation-targeting central banks, each of these
inflation rates is measured using the national CPI. 2
Basics of the Consumer Price Index
A price index is a weighted average of the prices of
individual goods and services. In Canada, the CPI
is based on roughly 600 goods and services that
feature in an average household’s spending on
things such as food, housing, transportation,
furniture, clothing, and recreation. The weights on
prices are based on expenditure shares, sometimes
collectively called the basket of goods and services
in the CPI. So, if groceries make up 25 percent of a
typical household’s spending, for example, then the
weight on groceries will be 0.25. One way to find a
basket is to use survey data on consumer spending
from the past. The resulting weights then are used
to find the price of the overall basket in the past,
and the same weights are used to find the price of
the basket today. The annual percentage growth
rate of the resulting index, or weighted average, is
what we usually mean by the phrase “CPI inflation
rate.” The technical shorthand for this way of
finding a basket – that is, using an expenditure
pattern from the past – is to refer to it as a
Laspeyres index, after German economist Étienne
Laspeyres (1834-1913), who first proposed it.
Statistics Canada uses exactly this method, except
that it updates the weights every four years using
information on expenditure from the Survey of
Household Spending. The weights were last updated
in May 2007 using spending patterns from 2005.
CPI inflation is a natural target for several
reasons. Since the CPI is used in the tax system and
in wage setting, it is the price index most familiar to
the public. As well, it is produced monthly, is not
subject to revisions, and is released quickly after the
month to which it applies (about three weeks into
the subsequent month).
Biases in the CPI
Although the CPI is popular with inflation-
targeting central banks, index-number specialists
have long been aware of its shortcomings as a
measure of the cost of living. These shortcomings
have become more widely known in part due to the
1996 Advisory Commission to Study the
Consumer Price Index (more commonly known as
the Boskin Commission) in the United States.
One of the CPI’s shortcomings arises
automatically because it is based on past or lagged
expenditure weights. If consumers tend to shift
their spending away from goods with rapidly rising
prices, then the inflation rate they experience will
be less than the one that was calculated using their
old spending pattern. Since the CPI inflation rate
uses the old spending pattern, it overstates the
increase in the cost of living by not allowing for
substitution over outlets (say, toward Internet
shopping) or commodities (say, toward turnips
when broccoli prices rise). This syndrome is
referred to as substitution bias. One way to avoid
this bias might be to use a present-day basket to
weight prices, a method that yields a measure called
a Paasche index, after another German economist,
Hermann Paasche (1851-1925). But the inflation
rate measured with a Paasche index displays the
mirror image of the problem of the Laspeyres index
by tending to understate the inflation rate in the
cost of living.
The second main bias in the CPI arises because
of changes in the quality of goods and services or
the introduction of new goods and the
disappearance of old ones. For example, the current
basket includes some consumer goods built around
cathode ray tubes, which play a declining role in
household spending. A variety of statistical
techniques exist, however, for adjusting for new
goods and changes in quality.3
2 Siklos (forthcoming, 2009) describes international experiences with inflation targeting.
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How Large Are the Biases? 
The Bank of Canada studies and periodically
reports on the biases in CPI inflation. One such
study, by Rossiter (2005), estimates that the 12-
month CPI inflation rate overstates cost-of-living
inflation by 0.6 of a percentage point on average.
Thus, the official 1 to 3 percent target range for
CPI inflation implies a band between 0.4 and 2.4
percent (on average) for the growth rate of this
underlying cost. An interesting feature of this
estimate is that the biases in the CPI inflation rate
do not seem to be trending over time, so it is fairly
easy for the Bank simply to adjust its target range
for the largest value of the bias that has been
observed in the past. If the largest bias were 
1 percentage point, for example, then setting the
floor of the target range at 1 percent, and never
falling below that rate, would avoid deflation in 
the cost of living. 
Of course, this bias does accumulate over time in
the level of the CPI. Within a four-year period
between resettings of the CPI basket, a pioneering
central bank that targeted the path of the price level
would be subject to increased substitution bias. At a
minimum, reformulating the existing CPI by
updating its basket more frequently would be
indispensable under price-level-path targeting. Even
better, using a real-time index designed to adjust for
substitution bias would be a natural complement to
price-level-path targeting.
How to Avoid Substitution Bias
One way to avoid substitution bias, and so measure
the inflation rate accurately, is to follow Diewert’s
(1998b) suggestion to take the geometric average of
the Laspeyres and Paasche indexes, which produces
what is called the Fisher ideal price index, after US
economist Irving Fisher (1867-1947). Just to
complete our guide to the terminology, indexes
such as this one, which combine the two traditional
measurements and are immune to substitution bias,
are sometimes called superlative indexes. However,
statistical agencies do not report, and central banks
do not target, the Fisher ideal index because current
expenditure patterns – the weights in a Paasche
index – are known only with a significant lag,
which makes it less timely than the traditional CPI.
Thus, if one were to adopt such an index, the
choice would be between delaying the release of the
index (which seems bad) or making it subject to
significant revisions (which also seems bad).
There is, however, a real-time, monthly index –
constructed for the United States by Shapiro and
Wilcox (1997) – that minimizes substitution bias.
This index uses lagged expenditure weights and a
technical assumption about household budgeting
that permits the forecasting of current weights. This
index also has the remarkable feature of tracking or
predicting changes in the Fisher ideal index, while
being able to be produced at the same monthly
frequency as the CPI.
Thus, there are tools for correcting for
substitution bias in a monthly index, or at least
estimating those corrections. Yet, to my knowledge,
no statistical agency has adopted the Shapiro-
Wilcox approach. Perhaps statisticians think that
there is too much statistical uncertainty involved in
estimating the precise degree of substitution that
has taken place, or that past substitution behaviour
might not be a good guide to the present.
What statistical agencies have begun to do over
the past decade is to use a superlative index such as
the Fisher index, which avoids substitution bias,
usually combined with chain weighting. In a chain-
weighted or chained index, the past weights (going
into the Laspeyres components) are always from the
immediately previous time period and so are
updated automatically every period, rather than
intermittently. The US Bureau of Labor Statistics,
for example, has issued a chained CPI at the
national level – the so-called C-CPI-U, where C
stands for chained and U stands for urban
consumers – since August 2002. The index is first
issued in preliminary form, and then is revised
twice as data on expenditures become available.
Figure 1 shows the 12-month inflation rates in the
traditional US CPI-U (the black line) and new C-
CPI-U (the grey line) since December 2000 (the
earliest date to which the C-CPI-U applies is
December 1999).
As expected, given the resistance to substitution
bias in this index, the inflation rate in the C-CPI-U
is systematically lower than that in the better-
known CPI-U. For the 93-month period shown inCommentary 287 | 5
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Figure 1: Inflation in the US CPI-U and C-CPI-U, January 2001 – June 2008
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm
the figure, the average US inflation rate was 2.86
percent in the CPI and 2.50 percent in the C-CPI-
U, for an average difference of 0.36 of a percentage
point. It will be interesting to track this difference,
as well as the scale of revisions, over time.4
The Consumption Price Index 
as an Alternative to the CPI 
Of course, Canada does use chained, Fisher indexes
in the quarterly National Income and Expenditure
Accounts. Among these, it would be natural to
consider the chained price index for consumption
(CPIC) as a potential target.5The US Federal
Reserve monitors the corresponding US index, the
personal consumption expenditure (PCE) deflator,
so it is worthwhile to ask whether the Canadian
equivalent might complement or replace the CPI as
a target for monetary policy.
As Diewert (2001) notes, designing a
consumption deflator uses different criteria than
does designing a cost-of-living index. The CPIC is
based on dividing nominal consumption
expenditures by the chained, Fisher volume index
and so is itself a chained, Fisher index (between the
previous and current quarters). It is a weighted
average of the Laspeyres and Paasche indexes but
with continuously updated weights on the lagged
expenditure pattern – that is, chaining. It thus
avoids substitution bias, unlike the CPI. 
What signal does the CPIC inflation rate give to
policymakers? Figure 2 shows the quarterly average
of the 12-month Canadian CPI inflation rate (the
black line) and the four-quarter inflation rate 
in the implicit chained price index for personal
4 An extreme and inaccurate version of this adjustment takes place in Argentina, where the government requires its statisticians simply to remove
products with rapidly rising prices from the official CPI basket, supposedly to combat substitution bias, but in fact deliberately to understate
the inflation rate.
5 The GDP deflator does not make an appealing candidate as a target because it contains large shares of exports and capital goods and it gives
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consumption expenditures (the grey line), both
since the start of 2001. As one would expect, given
their construction, the CPIC inflation rate was less
than the CPI inflation rate in every quarter. Over
these 29 quarters, the average inflation rate was
2.23 percent in the CPI and 1.22 percent in the
CPIC, a difference of 1.01 percentage points. This
difference is an alternative to the Bank of Canada’s
measure of the bias in the CPI inflation rate. It is in
the same direction as the Bank’s estimate of 0.6
percentage points, but noticeably greater. And it
might still underestimate the bias, because it omits
both substitution bias at very fine levels of
disaggregation (finer than the categories in the
index) and bias due to quality improvements or
new goods.
This average difference of 1.01 percentage points
is also sensitive to the time period over which the
averages are calculated. I do not claim that the bias
is as large as 1.01 percentage points for all time
periods. But variation in the average bias with the
time period strengthens the case for switching to a
superlative inflation rate, for that variation means
that one cannot just subtract a constant, like 0.6 or
1.0, from the CPI inflation rate to get the
superlative one.
Figure 2 also captures a disadvantage of the
CPIC measure: the national accounts for a given
quarter are issued with a lag of roughly two
months, whereas the CPI is released with a lag of
three weeks. Thus, as of late July 2008, we knew
the CPI inflation rate for the second quarter of
2008 (which Figure 2 shows), but not the CPIC
inflation rate for the same period. The CPIC
measure has two other disadvantages, however, that
Figure 2 does not capture. First, there is uncertainty
about the measure’s preliminary values, because of
the possibility of later revisions; consequently, as
Steindel (1997) notes, the CPIC might not send an
accurate message about the change in the inflation
rate even if it eventually is more accurate about the
level. Second, the CPIC is recorded quarterly,
whereas the CPI inflation rate is recorded monthly
(although Figure 2 shows its quarterly average). The
quarterly frequency of the CPIC also seems low


































Figure 2: Inflation in the CPI and CPIC, 2001:Q1 – 2008:Q2
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action dates per year. That fact raises the question
of whether higher-frequency observations of the
12-month CPI inflation rate provide valuable
information. I discuss that question below when
discussing the role of core inflation.
Reforms 
Overall, there is a trend towards chained, Fisher
indexes among statistical agencies. Perhaps Statistics
Canada will follow this trend and introduce an
analog to the US C-CPI-U based on a Paasche
component that is either forecasted or released with
a delay, or both. It might be hard to imagine
economic analysts, tax authorities, wage bargainers,
and central banks all switching their focus from the
current CPI to an index with a longer delay and
revisions, but such an index would be a useful
complement to the CPI and provide an ongoing
estimate of its inaccuracy, even if it did not
completely replace the traditional CPI.
A second, very useful reform would be to update
the CPI basket more frequently – say, annually.
Currently there is the possibility of a saw-tooth
pattern in the biases in CPI inflation, on a four-year
cycle. With the current, 2005-based weights, the
inflation rate might be overstated more in 2011
than in 2007, because the weights will be staler
then.
The issue of whether or not a longer delay in
learning a superlative price index matters is related,
of course, to the targeting framework itself. If a
central bank’s goal is for every monthly value of the
12-month CPI inflation rate to lie in the 1 to 3
percent band, then it will want to learn this value as
quickly as possible in case it needs to change course.
Diewert (1983, 1998a, 1999) has suggested instead
a target of the centred moving average of 13
months of the 12-month CPI inflation rate, or else
one of five quarters of the four-quarter CPIC
inflation rate. The idea is that this smoothing
would eliminate seasonality and smooth the
sometimes volatile fluctuations in the inflation rate.
Whether we call this proposal smoothed inflation
targeting or a variety of flexible inflation targeting,
it would be less sensitive to the most recently
reported price index and, therefore, to any delay in
constructing the index. So, using an analog to the
US C-CPI-U or else the CPIC might fit
comfortably in such a framework.
I would argue, however, that were Statistics
Canada to produce an analog to the US C-CPI-U,
the Bank of Canada should simply target its 12-
month growth rate. Waiting an extra month or two
to learn a relatively accurate measure of inflation
(and how well the Bank has succeeded in meeting
its inflation target) seems preferable to the earlier
revelation of a measure with a systematic bias of 0.6
to 1 percentage points. After all, this bias is 30 to
50 percent of the midpoint of the current target
range for inflation, which is a large penalty to pay
in accuracy in exchange for the early
announcement of traditional CPI inflation.
Immediacy matters less for the target than it does
for the operational guide.
Updating the CPI basket more frequently, or
introducing a chained, superlative, monthly
replacement for the CPI would, of course, involve
costs for Statistics Canada. My focus is on the use
of indexes in monetary policy, so I leave it to the
reader to estimate the effect on total federal
government outlays of a reform that would
significantly (and correctly) lower the measured
inflation rate; how to index those outlays was
precisely the focus of the US Boskin Commission.
Real and Financial Asset Prices
One of the most active subjects of debate
concerning the CPI generally and its use in
monetary policy in particular involves how it treats
asset prices. When we think of the CPI as a cost-of-
living index, it is natural to assume that it would
include estimates of the cost of a flow of
consumption services. But how an index treats
durable goods prices – and how closely it captures
the price of that service flow – differs significantly
across countries. That means it is not as easy to
compare the track records of different central banks
as one would hope, even though all inflation-
targeting banks use a CPI target.
How to Handle House Prices 
There are four different ways to treat the price of a
durable good in the CPI: (a) omit it; (b) use the6 Diewert (2007) suggests a further refinement, the opportunity-cost approach, which takes the maximum of the market rent and the user cost.
7 The UK index that more closely resembles the Canadian CPI is the retail price index.
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acquisition price; (c) calculate the rental equivalent;
or (d) calculate the user cost.6 Statistical agencies
use (b), the acquisition price, for most durable
goods, such as automobiles or furniture. For owner-
occupied housing, all four approaches are in use.
This choice certainly matters to measuring
inflation, for housing costs can comprise a large
share of the cost of living that the CPI attempts to
measure.
The CPI that is used in the euro area and
targeted in the United Kingdom uses method (a),
giving zero weight to owner-occupied housing
costs.7 In the United States, the Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS) uses (c), the rental-equivalent
approach. Diewert (2003) explains how to
implement this approach using either owners’
estimates of rent or a statistical model that imputes
(that is, estimates) rents to owner-occupied housing
based on detailed information about the charac-
teristics of the dwelling combined with actual rents
on dwellings with similar characteristics. The BLS
instead uses only actual rents, for which the agency
has faced criticism because of persistent swings in
the ratio of rents to house prices. These swings can
last for years, so the choice of house-price
measurement certainly can matter over the horizon
with which a central bank is concerned. Moreover,
since the ratio of market rents to asset values tends
to fall as house values rise, the rental-equivalence
approach tends to give too small a weight to
housing in the CPI compared to the corresponding
user-cost valuation. If house prices rise faster than
prices in general, as in the recent past, this effect
will lead CPI inflation to understate the true
inflation rate or to be biased downward. If, instead,
house prices fall faster than other prices, the CPI
inflation rate will be biased upward.
The User-Cost Approach in Canada 
Statistics Canada uses (d), the user-cost approach,
which includes estimates of a homeowner’s
replacement cost (depreciation) and of mortgage
interest cost (see Diewert 2003). Baldwin and
Mansour (2003) show that measured CPI inflation
is quite sensitive to the treatment of owner-
occupied housing.
There are, however, two problems with Statistics
Canada’s treatment of housing costs. First, it
includes only the mortgage interest cost as a user-
cost component and not the opportunity cost of
the equity tied up in a house. This omission tends
to make their weight on housing too small. Second,
a true user cost that tries to mimic market rents
would include an estimate of the anticipated capital
gain on holding the house (recall that depreciation
raises the user cost of an asset, so appreciation
lowers it), but Statistics Canada does not deduct
this anticipated capital gain from its measure of the
user cost. Omitting this factor – admittedly quite
challenging to measure – tends to make its estimate
of the user cost too high and the weight on housing
too large. A constructive step might be for Statistics
Canada to report several possible series (or
components thereof) for owner-occupied housing.
Researchers then could work with these series and
perhaps reach a consensus on the empirical
importance of the user-cost components.
Is the User Cost Too Responsive to the
Overnight Interest Rate? 
Some commentators argue that the inflation target
should exclude components, such as mortgage
interest, that are closely related to the central bank’s
policy tools. According to this argument, if the
Bank of Canada were to raise its target for the
overnight interest rate, with a view to lowering the
future inflation rate, mortgage rates would rise as
well, because these interest rates tend to move
roughly in tandem with money-market rates. If
mortgage interest were to be included in the CPI
through the user cost of housing, then the CPI also
would rise, which would yield an incorrect signal of
the longer-term impact of the policy change.
Is this a case where the best cost-of-living index is
not the best target for monetary policy? I think not.
There are a variety of ways in which an increase in
the general level of interest rates might be passed
through by firms into higher prices. And the BankIndependent ￿ Reasoned ￿ Relevant C.D. Howe Institute 
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of Canada is an old hand at explaining that reacting
to inflation expectations by raising nominal interest
rates in the short run will lead to lower nominal
interest rates (through the Fisher effect) in the long
run. Similarly, the Bank does not argue that
changes in its policy rate primarily cause changes in
today’s inflation rate.
Canada’s core CPI, the CPIX, excludes mortgage
interest costs precisely for this reason. (It excludes
other items for different reasons, discussed below.)
It is possible, then, that it helps forecast future
inflation in the total CPI, but in itself that feature
would not make the CPIX a natural candidate as a
target.
Another criticism sometimes made of the user
cost is that it varies widely across cities or regions,
because house prices do. Again, though, regional
CPIs can and do vary for a range of reasons. And
the Bank of Canada also is accustomed to
explaining that it targets a national average and that
relative price changes (or inflation differentials)
across regions convey valuable information to both
households and firms.
Asset Prices and Inflation Targets 
Of course, the prices of houses, as well as those of
financial assets, also feature in debates on monetary
policy for two additional reasons. First, asset prices
might provide useful information about the future
path of inflation – for example, through wealth
effects on consumption spending – and so be useful
indicator variables for central banks. Second, large
swings in asset prices might be early warning signals
of instability in the financial system, with
implications for later employment or inflation.
Some economic research suggests that prices of
financial assets should be incorporated directly in
price indexes – although Diewert (2002, 560-65)
has criticized this approach. For example, Reis
(2005) has constructed a cost-of-living dynamic
price index for the United States based on forecasts
of lifetime prices, on which asset prices directly
provide information. The underlying idea is to
create a long-term index of changes in the cost of
living over one’s remaining life. The same good
consumed at two different ages is treated as two
different goods, and its prices on both dates enter
the index. From this perspective, there would be a
novel, added substitution bias in the CPI, because a
consumer can respond to a high price by
substituting over time – say, by waiting for a sale or
even for a senior’s discount – as well as over goods.
This thought-provoking approach might well see
further application in the future. 
Lessons from Research on Optimal
Monetary Policy 
There is no reason an index that is best for
measuring the cost of living should necessarily be
the best target for monetary policy. Historically,
central banks have often targeted such things as the
price of gold or the price of a US dollar that have
little to do with consumer welfare directly. But one
certainly would want to consider the effects on
consumers of the choice to target a specific index. 
Inflation can affect consumers in a variety of
ways. For example, an unexpected burst of inflation
redistributes income from savers to borrowers,
while unpredictable inflation can inhibit decision-
making by making it difficult to disentangle
changes in relative prices from changes in the
overall price level. Inflation also can affect how
resources are allocated if there are frictions in the
economy, in the form of wages or prices that are
locked in for significant periods of time or “sticky.”
In this section, I focus on this last effect, because
economists have argued that these frictions matter
specifically for the choice of price index that a
central bank should target.
Formally, we can approach the question of what
to target by first asking what distortions (such as
sticky prices or real rigidities) give rise to a
stabilization role for monetary policy, and then
finding a price index that best reflects those
distortions. Recent research on optimal monetary
policy takes exactly these two steps. The word
“optimal” in this research simply means that the
central bank is tasked with designing policy to
make the welfare of a typical household as high as
possible. For example, optimal policy can involve
varying the short-term interest rate to offset some
other shocks that hit the economy, if households
are not immediately able to adjust to those shocks
on their own.Independent ￿ Reasoned ￿ Relevant C.D. Howe Institute 
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Before outlining the implications of this research,
I note that there is a particular reason to pay
attention to this approach in discussing the Bank of
Canada’s targets. The Bank’s officers have said that
they are researching the use of price-level targeting
(or price-level-path targeting). There is little
historical evidence to draw on in predicting the
impact of price-level targeting, however, so
macroeconomic models must perforce play an
important role in assessing it. Today’s
macroeconomic models include a number of key,
relative prices, so it is certainly worthwhile to ask
what lessons they yield for the choice of target, too.
Targeting Prices in Sticky-Price Sectors 
The basic idea in this research is that a careful
central bank wants price stability (to minimize
price-adjustment costs) and also wants to allow
efficient and necessary changes in relative prices.
The implication of this reasoning is as follows. If
sector A has flexible prices and sector B has sticky
ones, then the central bank should stabilize the
price in sector B; sector A then will absorb any
relative price changes (see Goodfriend and King
1997; King and Wolman 1998; and Aoki 2001).
With a range of sectors, varying in their
stickiness, an index for policy to target would place
more weight on stickier sectors. For example,
suppose that wages and prices are both sticky.
Then, if the central bank stabilizes prices, real
wages often will be misaligned. Policy might do
better by stabilizing a weighted average of wages
and prices.
Mankiw and Reis (2003) offer an interesting
example of this approach. Instead of using weights
on individual or sectoral prices that reflect budget
shares, they propose choosing weights so that, if the
central bank targets the resulting index, then the
economy will be as stable as possible. They call this
the stability price index. The underlying idea is that
there is an output gap that the central bank would
like to stabilize but cannot observe directly. The
output gap would be zero if prices were completely
flexible, which is the situation the central bank tries
to replicate. The bank learns about this gap, or the
general state of the economy, by watching prices.
Prices that are completely flexible or in sectors that
are subject to large, idiosyncratic shocks do not
provide much information on the output gap,
while prices that are sticky or in sectors that do
move with the overall cycle are more informative. A
stability price index for monetary policy gives them
a higher weight. When Mankiw and Reis apply
their recipe to the United States, they are led to
recommend a large weight on nominal wages, an
indicator that does not even enter the CPI.
At the Bank of Canada, de Resende, Dib, and
Kichian (2008) have developed a model of the
Canadian economy with multiple sectors, each with
frictions in adjusting to shocks. The frictions
include costs in moving factors between sectors or
in adjusting prices and wages. They find indirect
evidence that the sector producing goods that are
not traded internationally is the stickiest one, or the
one with the most frictions. But they also calculate
that the optimal policy target is the CPI inflation
rate, not the inflation rate in this nontradable
sector. The logic is that all sectors have frictions, so
targeting nontradable inflation would place a
burden of adjustment on all other sectors. Targeting
CPI inflation is a compromise, with a lower average
burden of adjustment. That approach reduces
volatility in all sectors, and so leads to the lowest
costs of reallocating resources. (There might be a
weighting of sectors that does even better, but their
insight that the index should involve all sectors
remains valid.)
Wolman (2005) notes that there might be trends
in relative prices across sectors that also differ by
stickiness. For example, suppose that services prices
tend to rise relative to goods prices over time –
opera tickets gradually become more costly relative
to laptop computers – and that service prices are
relatively sticky. This approach then yields the
recommendation that the Bank of Canada should
try to stabilize services prices and let goods prices
bear the burden of relative price adjustment. If it
succeeded, the result would be an overall deflation.
Implications for Policy 
The goal of minimizing adjustment costs that is
built into these studies of ideal monetary policy
might seem to rationalize focusing on core inflation
as a target, not just as a guide. Suppose that there is
a positive shock to gasoline prices and that those
prices are flexible. If the Bank of Canada tried toIndependent ￿ Reasoned ￿ Relevant C.D. Howe Institute 
8 Bodenstein, Erceg, and Guerrieri (2008) provide a recent application of this approach.
9 Macklem (2001) describes the development of the CPIX in Canada, while Laflèche and Armour (2006) provide an update on the properties of
candidate ways to measure core inflation.
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stabilize the CPI, its policy would depress demand
and so lower inflation in the other, sticky-price
sectors of the economy. But this would be
inefficient. In the optimal-policy approach, the goal
of policy is to make the economy operate as if
prices were flexible, so as to save on adjustment
costs. The ideal policy would keep core inflation
and employment stable, while letting gasoline
prices move around.8
However, the selection of prices to omit from the
core CPI is based on volatility outcomes that do
not necessarily reflect underlying frictions or costs
of adjustment. Observing that lawyers adjust their
prices less frequently than plumbers does not imply
that members of the bar face high adjustment costs;
they might simply experience fewer shocks. More
broadly one might wonder how stable different
price-setting customs are across sectors. Overall,
then, the concept of targeting the apparently sticky
sector does not yet seem to provide a way to
improve on the CPI, the CPIC, or a new C-CPI as
a target. 
The Operational Guide: Core Inflation 
The Bank of Canada distinguishes between its
target, the CPI inflation rate (sometimes called
“headline inflation”) and its operational guide, core
inflation. The idea underlying core inflation as an
operational guide is that today’s core inflation is a
predictor of CPI inflation a year or more later. As a
result, monetary policy that responds to the current
level of core inflation, in the end, will influence
future inflation appropriately.
Core inflation is measured with the CPIX – that
is, the CPI excluding its eight most volatile
components (out of 54 broad categories), with the
remaining components adjusted for the effects of
indirect taxes. The eight excluded components –
fruit, vegetables, gasoline, natural gas, fuel oil,
tobacco, intercity transportation, and mortgage-
interest costs – account for roughly 16 percent of
the Canadian consumption basket.9 In this section,
I outline five criteria that one might consider in
designing a measure of core inflation:
communicability, volatility, persistence, the degree
to which it shares a trend with headline inflation,
and the ability to forecast headline inflation. I also
comment on which criteria guided the Bank of
Canada in selecting its current measure, the CPIX.
Communicability
Superficially, the Bank of Canada’s drawing
attention to an inflation measure that excludes the
cost of filling a gas tank or buying bananas might
make it seem out of touch. Central banks that use
core inflation as an operational guide often are
criticized for focusing on an irrelevant index that
excludes many of the things that are most
important for consumers. So the first
communication challenge associated with the use of
core inflation is to explain what it is used for: as a
guide to setting interest rates by virtue of its
predicting future CPI inflation. 
The second communication challenge is to
explain how the Bank constructs the CPIX. Central
banks experiment with core measures by (a)
excluding some components (as in the CPIX); (b)
reweighting components – as in Canada’s CPIW,
which weights components inversely to their
volatility, or the core inflation measures
MEANSTD and WMEDIAN, which are
constructed by trimming the distribution of price
changes to omit extreme values each month; or (c)
using statistical methods to smooth headline
inflation or isolate its low-frequency components.
One of the best arguments in favour of measures
found by exclusion, such as the CPIX, is that they
are relatively easy to understand and explain. That
feature makes it more likely that they will influence
the expectations of future inflation that central
banks seek to manage.
Understandably, central banks also evaluate
measures of core inflation periodically – Laflèche
and Armour (2006) describe a recent evaluation.
From time to time they might find that a new
measure has good statistical properties, but usingIndependent ￿ Reasoned ￿ Relevant C.D. Howe Institute 
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10 As a brief technical note, exclusion could be based on the volatility of individual components or of the entire group. It is possible that, although
the prices of both gasoline and bananas are volatile, they might be negatively correlated, so that an average of the two prices is not volatile. 
In that case, omitting the combination would not necessarily make core inflation less volatile than headline inflation. In practice, though, this
syndrome does not seem to arise; correlations among those omitted prices are relatively small, so excluding components based on their
individual volatilities does make core inflation relatively smooth.
the same measure over time seems sure to help with
communication.
Volatility
The eight components excluded from the CPIX are
those that tend to have the most volatile prices. If
price changes in these components are temporary,
one would not want the Bank of Canada to
respond to them by changing its target for the
overnight interest rate. By the time the interest-rate
change affected the economy, the price change
would have been reversed, so a policy of reacting to
changes simply would add cycles to the economy.
Core inflation, which is what is left after excluding
these volatile components, thus is a smoother series
that better captures the trend in headline inflation,
and using it means that policy reactions are less
likely to need correcting.10
A pitfall with any measure of core inflation,
however, is that it can create the false impression
that some prices matter more than others. The idea
that policy should not be guided by the prices of
gasoline and bananas today is, in fact, consistent
with the Bank of Canada’s concern about all prices
in the future. Focusing on core inflation also can
create the false impression that inflation is caused
by changes in relative prices, as Laidler and Aba
(2000) note. Assuming that banana prices can be
overlooked in forecasting inflation does not mean
that an increase in the price of bread – which is in
the CPIX – is inflationary.
Persistence 
What if a change in relative prices is permanent,
rather than temporary? As Mishkin (2007)
discusses, even under this scenario, the central bank
should not necessarily react to the departure of
headline inflation from core inflation. If there is a
one-time, permanent change in the price of
gasoline, for example, that will appear as a spike in
the inflation rate, but it will not necessarily cause an
ongoing inflation. Of course, if there were a trend
in the relative prices of the eight components
excluded from the CPIX, then core inflation would
work badly as a forecast, especially since these items
comprise a significant share of spending for
households most affected by inflation.
One would suppose that persistent or permanent
changes in relative prices would be more likely to
feed through into ongoing inflation – that is, to
have so-called second-round effects – perhaps by
influencing inflation expectations. If that is the
case, persistence probably should count against
candidates for exclusion in defining core inflation. 
I have not seen this issue discussed directly in Bank
of Canada documents as a design criterion, though
there is no doubt that officials closely monitor
persistence in practice. 
Figure 3A shows the CPI and the CPIX since
2001; Figure 3B shows the same series, but in 12-
month growth rates. Note that core inflation is
much less volatile than headline inflation. But just
as evident is the fact that the differences have been
quite persistent at times.
A Common Trend 
For core inflation to influence expectations, it
would be helpful if it shared a common trend with
headline inflation. Looking back at recent inflation
history, one would like the average core inflation
rate to be very similar to the average headline rate.
Over the 90 months from January 2001 to June
2008, however, the average rate of headline
inflation was 2.24 percent, while the average rate of
core inflation was 1.95 percent. This comparison
can be sensitive to the time period being used, but
this is a substantial difference.
Recall that Figure 2 showed that the CPIC
inflation rate also was below the CPI inflation rate
during this time period. The reader might wonder
if the CPIX could act as a proxy for the CPIC, so
that targeting the monthly CPIX would sidestepIndependent ￿ Reasoned ￿ Relevant C.D. Howe Institute 
the issue of substitution bias in the CPI inflation
rate. Unfortunately, this pattern can just be a
coincidence. Omitting volatile items, to produce
the CPIX, need not yield an index that mimics a
superlative one.
Core inflation could be defined as the trend
component of inflation, or as the common
component of inflation in a set of individual prices.
Reis and Watson (2007) estimate a statistical model
that divides the inflation rates of 187 components
of the US PCE deflator into a common component
and relative price changes. The common compo-
nent, which they call pure inflation, is defined to
have an equiproportional effect on all prices and to
be uncorrelated with relative price changes. Reis
and Watson find that most variation in US
inflation, especially since the 1990s, has reflected
relative price changes, not variations in their pure
inflation measure.
Forecastability
Economists often argue that core inflation should
help to forecast headline inflation, and central
banks sometimes use this as a criterion for selecting
a core measure. In fact, today’s core inflation rate
might be even better than today’s headline inflation
rate at forecasting future headline inflation. As we
have seen, the ability to forecast the target inflation
rate is a good property for an operational guide to
have, because of the delayed effects on inflation of
changes in monetary policy. 
The forecasting criterion explains why mortgage-
interest cost is excluded from the CPIX. This
component of the CPI is not especially volatile,
unlike the other components; it is excluded because
it varies quite directly with changes in the target for
the overnight interest rate and so does not provide
information on the future path of inflation (or
perhaps even does so with the wrong sign).
To assess or select a core measure based on the
forecasting criterion, economists look for a
statistical relationship between headline inflation in
a given month and core inflation in previous
months, especially at lags such as 12 to 24 months,
over which policy changes affect prices. They test
this relationship using so-called real-time methods,
being careful to fit a regression line using only data
points that were available at the time forecasts were
being made.
Unfortunately, two problems arise in designing
or testing core inflation measures this way. First,
suppose one defines core inflation by excluding
various components of the CPI to maximize the
forecasting record of what remains. (Of course, if
this is the design criterion, it cannot be a separate
evaluation criterion for the same time period.)
Usually, other economic indicators help to forecast
inflation, too. For example, today’s unemployment
rate or the location of headline inflation in the 1 to
3 percent target band might also be useful in
predicting headline inflation. Devotees of core
inflation do not argue that it is the only variable
needed in forecasting, but these multiple indicators
can give conflicting signals about future inflation in
some months. That conflict might make it difficult
to use core inflation as a guide for the public and
the basis for inflation expectations.
The second problem is more subtle. Imagine a
world with a central bank that succeeded in
keeping the inflation rate at exactly 2 percent. A
statistician in this world would look in vain for any
variable to help forecast the inflation rate. The same
sort of inability to forecast would arise if the
inflation rate departed from 2 percent but only for
short periods of time. Those blips in inflation
would not be predictable 12 to 24 months in
advance. Under successful inflation targeting,
nothing (other than the number 2) should help
forecast inflation. In fact, a pattern of
forecastability, where departures from 2 percent
could be predicted well in advance, would show
that there was room for improvement by the central
bank. For example, if a high unemployment rate
this month predicted an inflation rate below 2
percent in 18 months’ time, that pattern would
suggest the central bank should make its overnight
interest rate more responsive to today’s unemploy-
ment rate. Rowe and Yetman (2002) make this
argument in the context of Canadian inflation
targeting, and document how challenging it was to
forecast inflation once the Bank of Canada began
targeting it. Clinton (2006) applies this argument
to core inflation, arguing that core inflation does
not, and should not, help forecast headline
inflation.
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11 In practice, the difference could reflect a risk premium differential, too.
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A Final Comment on the Five Criteria
What conclusions can we draw from these five
criteria? One is that they might conflict – a core
measure constructed by omitting some volatile
prices might not necessarily have a common trend
with the CPI or be a good predictor. For the United
States, for example, Rich and Steindel (2005) find
that there is no single, best measure based on the
criteria of communicability, common trends, and
forecasting. It seems hard to escape the conclusion
that it might be better simply to use as an
operational guide either the Bank of Canada’s
inflation forecast or the second missing link: private
sector inflation expectations. As Macklem (2001)
notes, those who advocate the use of core inflation
do not argue that it can be the sole guide – in
trying to forecast inflation, there is no reason to
restrict oneself to using the CPI, either reweighted
or minus some components. Some central banks,
like the Bank of England, present their own
inflation forecasts in so-called fan charts that depict
margins of error that “fan out” into the future. But
there is something strange about a central bank’s
targeting 2 percent inflation yet reporting an
unconditional forecast that differs from that value.
Moreover, the central bank’s forecast naturally
could differ from the forecasts or expectations of
firms, and it is the latter that one is really interested
in, because they affect price setting today and the
evolution of headline inflation.
Inflation Expectations 
We can learn about inflation expectations most
directly in two ways: from bond markets or from
surveys of forecasters. Let us look at the ideal and
then at the Canadian reality in each case.
Measures from the Bond Market 
Imagine two discount bonds with the same issuer
(say, the Government of Canada), maturity (say, 12
months), tax status, and liquidity (say, high). One is
indexed to CPI inflation and one is not. The
difference between the yields on these two fixed-
income instruments then would serve as an estimate
of the expected, 12-month inflation rate, 12 months
in advance. This difference is sometimes called the
break-even inflation rate.11The appeal of a market-
based forecast such as this is that investment actions
might be worth more than survey words.
Break-even inflation rates are widely cited for
several countries. The Bank of England reports a
two-year break-even rate derived from the
longstanding market for indexed, gilt-edged
securities. In the United States, the Federal Reserve
Bank of Cleveland tries to correct for liquidity
differences and an inflation risk premium in the
difference between the yield on US Treasury
inflation-protected securities (TIPS) and the
corresponding unindexed yield; the maturity in the
TIPS case is 10 years.
Unfortunately, Canadian real return bonds have a
30-year maturity, and seem to be considerably less
liquid than conventional 30-year bonds. Christensen,
Dion, and Reid (2004), who provide an excellent
review and assessment of deducing inflation
expectations from these instruments, conclude that,
because of these maturity and liquidity characteristics
and other features of the bonds, the break-even
inflation rate in Canada is not particularly useful as
an inflation forecast. A solution to this problem
would be for the Government of Canada to issue real
return bonds with maturities of, say, one, two, and
five years. An active indexed debt market at these
maturities would enrich the opportunities for savers
and provide valuable indicators for the design of good
monetary policy.
Forecast Surveys
The alternative to reading the fixed-income tea
leaves is simply to ask some people their forecasts of
the inflation rate. Here the ideal probably would be
to ask professional forecasters or price-setting firms
and unions each month (or perhaps each quarter)
to predict the 12-month CPI inflation rate for
several horizons out to 18 months. The average of
their forecasts would be a very useful guide. One
thing we know about forecasting is that pooling
works. The average of a group of forecasts veryIndependent ￿ Reasoned ￿ Relevant C.D. Howe Institute 
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often is more accurate that any sequence of
predictions from an individual forecaster. Also ideal
would be to report individual forecasts, not just the
mean or median, so that the dispersion could be
used to measure uncertainty. 
One of the best examples of such a survey is the
Survey of Professional Forecasters conducted quarterly
by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. This
survey allows forecasters to remain anonymous, but
most choose to report their participation (although
their specific forecasts are not identified). Its
historical files provide individual forecasts. The
variables forecasted include quarter-to-quarter
changes in the CPI and several other price indexes
over the next four quarters as well as for five and
ten years. The survey is freely available to the
public. Another example is the Banco Central do
Brasil’s survey, which solicits information from
numerous analysts.
In Canada, forecast surveys are not quite as useful
for studying monetary policy, which might be why
they do not attract as much attention from financial
analysts. The Conference Board of Canada conducts
a valuable Survey of Forecasters each quarter. Unfor-
tunately, the forecasts are on a calendar-year basis
(rather than having a fixed horizon), the survey
reports only the mean, and the number of partici-
pants is small (six in summer 2008). Consensus
Economics Inc. conducts a monthly survey that
includes Canada; it provides individual forecasts,
but, again, only for calendar years. Although the
Consensus Economics surveys are available only by
paid subscription, the Bank of Canada is able to
report the average inflation forecasts in its quarterly
Indicators of Capacity and Inflation Pressures for
Canada. Statistics Canada does not survey
households or firms for their inflation predictions.12
The Bank’s own Business Outlook Survey could
be a fruitful source of information. Conducted
quarterly since 2004, it surveys about 100 firms in
sectors representative of GDP. It asks firms their
forecasts of CPI inflation over the next two years,
then reports the responses grouped into percentages
in four ranges: below 1 percent, 1 to 2 percent, 2 to
3 percent, and above 3 percent. Since two of the
categories in this histogram are unbounded,
however, there is no way to estimate the average
forecast. This horizon seems useful for debates
about monetary policy though, so ideally the Bank
would report the cross-forecaster mean and variance
(if not the entire distribution) to serve as an
expected inflation series.
With no widely accepted measure of inflation
expectations from bond markets or surveys, Bank of
Canada watchers and analysts could take the do-it-
yourself approach and construct their own index
designed to forecast inflation. Every quarter, the Bank
provides a long list of Indicators of Capacity and
Inflation Pressures for Canada that includes core
inflation and a measure of the output gap, among
many other variables. It should be possible to
construct an index of these indicators, designed to
forecast future CPI inflation, and track its departures
from 2 percent. When there are large changes in
relative prices, whether temporary or permanent, one
then could track whether this index changes in
response. If such an index had a good track record at
forecasting inflation, inflation expectations might
even come to coincide with it over time.
Conclusion and Recommendations 
In this Commentary, I have asked two questions about
the price index used in inflation targeting. First, what
index should the Bank of Canada target? Second,
what index should it use as an operational guide? 
On the subject of the target, I have argued that the
CPI continues to be an appropriate target for
monetary policy, in part because it is available
frequently and with no revisions. If technical
improvements to reduce bias in the CPI inflation
rate are difficult or slow in coming, the inflation-
target band could be set to allow at least for the
average bias. Because of its familiarity and coverage,
the CPI can be used readily to communicate the
benefits of a low level of inflation. Some recent
12 Statistics Canada formerly conducted a monthly Short-Term Expectations Survey that asked about forecasts for CPI inflation. The average
number of participants was 17, and the agency reported only the cross-forecaster mean. The inflation rate forecast was for the 12-month
change in the CPI, one month in advance. This is not a particularly challenging or interesting forecasting exercise. After all, when it comes to
predicting next month’s value for the 12-month growth rate of the CPI, 11/12ths of the outcome are already known. The survey ran from 1998
to 2000 and was then discontinued.Commentary 287 | 17
13 Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999), for example, refer to “the science of monetary policy,” while Goodfriend (2007) outlines “how the world
achieved consensus on monetary policy.”
14 This phrase is borrowed from Surowiecki (2004).
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economic research emphasizes the possibility of
superior stabilization of the economy using
alternative targets. But economists have not yet made
a convincing case for the differential stickiness across
sectors of the economy that would underpin an
index that would be preferred to the CPI.
However, although the CPI is the best available
index for inflation targeting, it could be improved.
The arguments I have presented in this Commentary
lead me to make five recommendations for the
target index, in order from least to most radical.
1. The Bank of Canada should revisit its estimates
of the bias in the CPI inflation rate on a regular
timetable, rather than intermittently.
2. Statistics Canada should update its CPI basket
more frequently than every four years. Ideally,
the updating would be annual. (The existence
of the CPIC does not obviate the need for this;
it, too, uses stale weights that are several years
out of date.)
3. Statistics Canada could improve its treatment of
owner-occupied housing in the CPI, and
perhaps also release information that would
allow researchers to study alternative treatments.
4. Statistics Canada should try to estimate a
monthly, chained, superlative index (with a
delay) as the US Bureau of Labor Statistics
does with its C-CPI-U. Despite the delays
and revisions that naturally arise with this
sort of index, it would improve our tracking
of inflation and so would complement the
existing CPI. 
5.  I would go further and argue that the Bank of
Canada should target the inflation rate in this
new, superlative index instead of the CPI
inflation rate. We currently use the realized
inflation rate to assess monetary policy; under
this recommendation, we would wait an extra
month or two to learn the realized value of the
target. This approach would be better than the
status quo, where, although we quickly learn an
estimate of the true inflation rate, it might have
a bias that is a large share of the target itself.
Prompt availability of information certainly does
matter for the operational guide, though. On this
second subject, I have argued in favour of a measure
of inflation expectations (rather than core inflation)
as a guide and a focus of communication. The
absence of an accepted measure of inflation
expectations in Canada is striking considering the
remarkable consensus among policymakers and
research economists about the practice of good
monetary policy and about the appropriate targets
and instruments.13 And the success of Canadian
monetary policy has contributed to this consensus. 
Inflation expectations play a key role in this
consensus approach. It is not necessarily
unscientific to use economic models involving
variables that we cannot directly observe, such as
the output gap or inflation expectations. But there
are ways to measure inflation expectations that we
have not yet taken advantage of in Canada.
Finally, then, on filling in this second missing
link, I have two recommendations concerning 
the operational guide: 
1. The Government of Canada could issue real
return bonds with maturities of one, two, and
five years. 
2. A combination of institutions could regularly
survey professional forecasters, so that we
gradually assemble a panel of their inflation
forecasts. 
If the Bank of Canada followed either of these
recommendations, it would no longer have to track
which exclusions or re-weightings give a single, core
inflation rate that best forecasts headline inflation.
The Bank’s periodic assessment of core measures is
admirable, yet somehow also worrying, as it implies
that the underlying statistical links might not be very
stable over time. A market-based or survey-based
measure automatically would reflect a mixture of
sources of forecasting information that evolves over
time. Moreover, whether it used the expertise of
bond traders or of professional forecasters, such a
measure would embody one thing we know about
forecasting: pooling across forecasters adds to
accuracy through the “wisdom of crowds.”14Independent ￿ Reasoned ￿ Relevant C.D. Howe Institute 
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